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Security Information

6 June 1953

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE**

**SUBJECT: BGFIEND/VALUABLE**

On 4 June 1953 [ ] DC/PP, handed [ ]  
[ ] British Secret Service (MI-6) Representative in Wash-  
ington, a copy of the attached memorandum as CIA's reply to the  
questions raised by [ ] in his conversation with [ ]  
[ ] on 1 June 1953 (see [ ] memorandum of 1 June on  
this same subject).

[ ] read the memorandum and said it made  
CIA's position perfectly clear.

[ ] [ ]  
[ ] [ ]  
Chief, Inspection and Review

cc: C/SE

WE-6 for [ ]

I&R chrono

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES/METHODS/EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

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1. It has been our strong feeling that [ ] should return as soon as possible to his post [ ]. His return had already been long delayed in view of our intention to keep him here for the proposed FIEND/VALUABLE Washington meeting which was subsequently cancelled by London. Consequently [ ] has been directed to return to his post and is now enroute directly [ ] by sea. In view of [ ] prolonged absence [ ] we do not feel that we possess sufficient information to come to an intelligent conclusion in the case of Gaqi Gogo. It is noted that the BK [ ] document was delivered to [ ] at a time when [ ] was absent from Rome and that the same document was presented to [ ] after [ ] departure for Washington on orders [ ]. Under these circumstances, it appears to us both logical and necessary that [ ] and [ ] reach a joint understanding as to their interpretation of this incident before any possibly premature and ill-informed decisions are reached at the Washington-London level. It was our hope, unfortunately dashed by London, that the proposed Washington meeting would bring [ ] and their responsible superiors together under circumstances which would permit an intelligent discussion of, and mutually satisfactory decision concerning, this incident.

2. We therefore feel it necessary that no action be taken concerning the case of Mr. Gogo until discussions have taken place between [ ] and [ ]. It is our earnest hope that these discussions will lead to an amicable resolution of the incident and that no further headquarters concern need be expended, either in Washington or in London.

3. In the event that [ ] and [ ] are unable to reach an agreement in this matter, we suggest that the question then be referred to a higher level FIEND/VALUABLE meeting which we hope can be arranged later in the summer and at which we hope to discuss a number of matters, including those items proposed by London as part of the agenda for the 8 June meeting which was cancelled.

4. If it should unfortunately prove unavoidable to handle the Gogo matter on a showdown basis as demanded by the BK, rather than on a basis of mutual adjustment and conciliation, we feel that it would also become unavoidable that other problems which have been festering in NCFA be brought before the NCFA executive committee to be handled on a comparable basis. We strongly feel, however, that this would be equally unfortunate and that all outstanding problems should be handled by conciliation. We further feel that it is absolutely essential to the success of this activity that the British and Americans present a united front to the NCFA as a whole.

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5. We hold no brief for Mr. Gogo personally and do not pre-judge him one way or the other. Nor do we feel prepared at this point to support either his retention or removal from his present position. We do not, however, consider Mr. Ihsan Toptani to be an acceptable replacement.

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## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

**INSTRUCTIONS:** Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:  ac/se				NO.  Memos	
				DATE  3 June	
TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. DD/P-IRR				WBS	
2.					
3. C/S E					Thanks. This subject
4.					4 - handled by handling
5.					[ ] A1-6
6.					
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[ ]  
cop. in Washington and  
made to more prepared  
by [ ] (see  
com attached) [ ]  
[ ] handle by  
the memo.

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JUN 3 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DD/P-I&R

SUBJECT: BGFIEND/VALUABLE

REFERENCE: Memorandum for the File, Subject as Above, Dated 1 June, 1953.

1. It is requested that you pass the following points to [ ]  
our early convenience:

A. With regard to the return of [ ] to his post it is our feeling that in view of our urgent need for his services in the field he should return without further delay and without passing through London. We would recall that [ ] return [ ] was postponed once already, at some inconvenience, with a view to holding him here for the proposed FIEND/VALUABLE meeting in Washington, which was subsequently cancelled. Mr. Lieb was able to make reservations on the Andrea Doria, leaving New York at noon on 3 June and we do not wish to delay his return to his post, where the situation among the emigre politicians is such that his presence is urgently required. We remain ready to discuss the Gogo incident on either the Washington-London level or the Rome Liaison level, but we see no need for [ ] to proceed to London before returning to Rome.

B. We propose that, upon his return [ ] take no action with respect to the charges levelled at Mr. Gaqi Gogo until such time as he has reached full agreement with [ ]. If at the time it appears that those charges are sufficiently serious to warrant taking action against Gogo, we propose, partly in the interest of fair play but even more with a view to clearing up what appears to be a very unwholesome situation in the NCFA in particular and the Albanian emigration in general, that certain other matters also be referred to the Executive Committee for decision, matters involving the irregular and unauthorized activities of other members of the NCFA.

C. In the event that [ ] and [ ] are unable to reach agreement on the handling of the Gogo problem, we suggest that the question be referred to a high-level FIEND/VALUABLE meeting which we hope can be arranged later in the summer and at which we hope to discuss a number of important matters.

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2. We pass on the following points for the information of [ ] in his discussions with [ ] and to help him in answering any questions which might be put to him by the British representatives.

A. The memorandum passed to [ ] by the BK could not be discussed with [ ] before [ ] departure [ ] (on orders and not on vacation). since [ ] was away [ ] not returning until after [ ] had left the city.

B. At the time of his discussions with the BK representatives, [ ] was requested to consider them as confidential in nature and to be treated only between the BK and himself; at the conclusion of these meetings [ ] was specifically requested by Vasil Andoni to "consider things as they were" prior to the discussions. In view of this it was [ ] understanding that no action would be taken before his return [ ]. The passing of the memorandum to [ ] immediately after [ ] departure not only constitutes a breach of faith on the part of the BK representatives but raises obvious questions as to their motives.

C. Upon [ ] arrival in Washington he reported fully to his headquarters. Since this matter appeared to be one which could best be handled on the level of our Rome liaison--especially since any action which might be taken would have to be on the basis of an Executive Committee decision rather than on the strength of a unilateral demand by one of the component elements of the NCFA--we advised [ ] on 9 May 1953 (OUT 60113) that [ ] would return direct [ ] it being understood that, if [ ] failed to reach agreement, the matter would be reviewed by London and Washington. It was made clear at that time that, while we made no brief for Gagi Gogo, we did not consider Ihsan Toptani to be a desirable replacement.

D. When, on 22 May, we were advised (IN 26937) that London considered this matter sufficiently important to warrant handling by Washington and London, we immediately (23 May) advised [ ] and [ ] (OUT 63188) that we would be very happy to meet with MI-6 representatives in Washington at the earliest possible date to discuss this and other matters relating to the NCFA.

E. Upon receipt of London agreement to such a meeting (26 May, IN 27738) we immediately cancelled [ ] reservations in order to hold him over until the conferences were completed c. 12 June.

F. It was, therefore, with some surprise that (28 May) we learned that the meeting was not to be held after all, (IN 28543) on the grounds that "discussions concerning a single operation by a case officer did not warrant such extended travel"--since we understood (IN 28034 and IN 26937) that both [ ] and [ ]

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[ ] felt the situation serious enough to warrant handling on the Washington-London level and since we had agreed (IN 26041 and OUT 63188) to a British-proposed agenda involving a variety of other matters of mutual interest.

G. While we do not overlook the fact that Gaqi Gogo appears to have become involved in activities not appropriate to his position as Executive Secretary, we deplore the statement of the BK, a single element of the NCFA, that "they cannot accept Mr. G. Gogh to act any more as administrative secretary of the NCFA", although we agree that they have every right to refer the matter to the Executive Committee for decision and we are quite prepared to support them in seeing that they have the opportunity to raise the matter in that Committee at the earliest possible moment.

H. By the same token we take exception to the unilateral BK demands (as reported by [ ]) that Gogo accept dismissal, vacate his flat, or turn over his archives--all this in the apparent absence of any reference to the Executive Committee, and contrary to assurances given to [ ] before his departure. The BK threat not to accept any decision which the Executive Committee may take would seem to be a further example of an attitude which appears hardly compatible with usual democratic processes.

[ ]  
[ ]  
[ ] Acting Chief, SE [ ]

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FROM: Deputy Chief, I&R 1 June 1953				NO. DATE	
TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
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1 June 1953

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE**

**SUBJECT: BGFIEND/VALUABLE**

[ ] British Secret Service (MI-6) Representative in Washington, raised the following points on 1 June 1953.

Prior to the time that [ ] left [ ] he received a memorandum from the BK of the Committee for Free Albania. This memorandum stated that GOGA must be fired or the BK would split off from the Committee for Free Albania. The reason given was that the BK has no faith in GOGA's integrity and alleged that GOGA has misapplied funds to run some of his own agents.

[ ] stated that his Service has been prodding [ ] CIA case officer, for some American reaction to the above situation. No reply has been forthcoming.

[ ] Service considers it essential that there shall be some joint policy on this matter prior to the time that [ ] returns to Rome.

[ ] further stated that:

(a) GOGA belongs to the Legalitat Party. While the BK is prepared to accept another member of the Legalitat, they are not prepared to accept GOGA. The objection is to the man and not to the Party.

(b) The Secret Service (MI-6) does not know the rights and wrongs of the BK complaint but feel in general that GOGA is unsatisfactory and it would be better if he were out of the way.

[ ] suggested that the above be called to the attention of [ ] since the subject might arise during the London

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meetings. He emphasized that the important thing is to settle on a joint policy prior to the time that [ ] departs for Rome.

[ ]  
Deputy Chief, Inspection and Review

Distribution:

Orig: DD/P  
1: DC/PP [ ]  
1: WE-6 for [ ]  
1: C/SE [ ]  
1: I&R chrono [ ]

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